Malebranche's principal discussion of his notion of seeing all things through God occurs in The Search after Truth, Book 3, part. 2, chapters 1-6. He begins by setting out the problem he wishes to address, namely, the notion of "idea." We do not have direct access to the external objects, but only have ideas (or perceptions) which presumably resemble those objects. He defines "idea" as "the immediate object, or the nearest thing to the mind when it perceives anything." A central problem in modern philosophy concerned the connection between our perceptions and the external objects which supposedly produce our perceptions. For example, if I perceive a red ball in front of me, I may be tempted to assume that the object in front of me has exactly the properties as I perceive them (such as a particular shade of red). This view is called direct realism, and Malebranche immediately dismisses this theory. Instead, for Malebranche, ideas in some way represent the object in question. This view is called representative realism. Accordingly, when Malebranche uses the word "idea" he restricts its meaning to mental perceptions which represent or copy some original thing. Malebranche divides mental perceptions into the following groups:
Internal Mental Perceptions < Spiritual External < MaterialMental perceptions in general are either internally produced or externally produced. Our internal mental perceptions (such as emotions) are not themselves ideas, since they do not copy or represent anything (unlike our idea-perceptions of external objects which in fact represent those objects). Properly speaking, then, ideas constitute our externally produced mental perceptions. Even here, though, there is an exception. Malebranche sees that some mental perceptions may be produced from an external spiritual source, such as telepathy, and thus do not represent or copy anything. At least in theory, some mental perceptions may be directly caused by an external spiritual source and would not involve any representative ideas. Malebranche's principal concern, though, is with mental perceptions caused by an external material source. These, he argues, necessarily are given to us as ideas which represent or copy the original object.
Let us grant Malebranche's initial point that the ideas of external things are only representations or copied images of the original object in question. The next question for Malebranche, then, is how we acquire these copied images of the original. Malebranche considers five possible theories of how represented ideas are fed to us. Through a process of elimination he concludes that we receive these ideas of external things from God who discloses them to us as he sees fit. The first possibility considered by Malebranche is that ideas of objects are fed to us by the objects themselves. He considers this theory as explained by Medieval philosophers who followed Aristotle, namely, the theory of emitted species. On this view, some kind of species or sense data particles are emitted by objects which carry the object's image to our senses. Malebranche rejects this view for three reasons. The first problem with this view is that the species particles themselves must be physical. However, at the same time, we must concede that they all are reduced to the size of a tiny (perhaps infinitely small) point. This is because at any point in space, we can see an infinite number of objects. The second problem with this view is that the same object produces species of different sizes depending on how close we are to the object. This is particularly problematic since it is difficult to conceive how this can be done in any single instant of time. The third problem is that the same species must be emitted by the different objects, yet we perceive them differently. Explain Malebranche's examples comparing a the side of a real cube with a picture of a parallelogram.
The second theory which Malebranche attacks is that objects make some kind of impression on our senses, and from these impressions we by ourselves form the ideas which represent the object. Since, on this theory, the initial impression does not resemble the object, then we ourselves have the power to create the idea which does resemble the object. The initial problem Malebranche sees with this theory is that ideas are spiritual in nature, and we are ascribing to ourselves the power of creating something spiritual out of nothing. Some people try to gloss over the issue by saying that it is not true creation since we are actually starting with something (i.e. the physical impressions of the object). Malebranche rejects such attempts to evade the real issue and he emphasizes all the more that this theory gives us the power to create something out of nothing. To illustrate his point, he argues that it is more difficult to create an angel out of stone than to create an angel from nothing. For, we can't make an angel from stone since they are of a different sort. Further, even if we did have the power to create something from nothing, we still could not create an idea of an object. This would require some prior access to that object to accurately depict it. Malebranche continues that even if we did have the power to create something from nothing, we still could not create an idea of an object. This would require some prior access to that object to accurately depict it.
Malebranche considers a possible defense that we naturally have some kind of confused ideas of things, and it is from these confused ideas that we develop the more distinct ideas which more accurately resemble the original object. Thus, we do not actually create our accurate ideas, but merely develop them. He rejects this view, though, since the naturally implanted idea would have to be distinct, otherwise it would be useless in helping us form an accurate idea. And, if the naturally implanted idea was distinct, we would not need to develop another idea from it. Malebranche notes a second possible defense: we conceive of something, such as a square, through our pure intellect, and then develop a visual image of it through our imagination. Again Malebranche has problems with this view since the imagined image is not an exact copy of the first. He concludes this part of the discussion by noting why people erroneously believe that the human mind has the power to create ideas. First, people observe that when they will to think about a certain idea, such as the idea of an elephant, then the image of an elephant appears. Since the act of willing and the emergence of the idea are correlated, they erroneously assume that the will causes the idea. Logicians refer to this error as the fallacy of false cause. It is this tendency to ascribe false causes to things which results in superstitions.
The third explanation of the origin of ideas which Malebranche attacks is that all ideas of the external world were innately implanted in our minds when we were created by God, and we merely recall these ideas. He argues that this theory would require an infinite number ideas, each with an infinite number of variations. God would not adopt this approach if there is an easier way to accomplish the same task. A second problem with this theory concerns how the soul could decide to pick out a given idea to represent a given object when we look at it. Malebranche turns to the fourth explanation of the origin of ideas. On this view, the human soul is of such a superior nature, that it contains within itself the spiritual nature of external things themselves (which are inferior). Ideas of external things, then, are copies of the spiritual nature of those things as they exist within our own souls. Malebranche replies that the above theory can only apply to God insofar as God created the external world. As creator, God made the world based on a set of ideas he had of all the world's creatures and objects. These ideas are part of God's nature, and, thus, God sees within himself the existence and nature of all the things he created. By contrast, humans are limited, and we do not contain within ourselves the existence and nature of all things. He argues that our limited nature prevents us from having the existence and nature of all other things within ourselves. To illustrate our limitations, he examines the human conception of infinity and explains that we perceive infinity, but don't comprehend it. He argues further that the ideas we have of external things clearly depend on something other than ourselves. First, ideas of things do not depend on our wills. Second, when we have hallucinations, these don't even correspond to anything real.
Seeing All Things Through God
Given the failure of the above four theories, Malebranche argues that we obtain ideas of external things by viewing them within God himself. For, God houses ideas of all external things, and, by his own choosing, allows us to see those ideas. This theory rests on the contention that spiritual entities reside in God. Malebranche maintains this for two reasons. First, as indicated above, as creator, God must have the ideas or blueprints of all things. Second, all spirits (and spiritual things such as ideas) dwell within God, just as all physical things dwell in space. Malebranche offers several proofs of his theory that we get ideas of external objects by viewing those ideas in God. He still is troubled, though, by the second rejected theory above (that God innately planted ideas of external things in our minds) and he sees this as the principal rival to his own theory. His first defense of his own theory, then, is that it is a more efficient explanation than that offered by the rival theory. He rejects the theory of innately implanted ideas of external things because it is less efficient than Malebranche's own theory. He illustrates God's efficiency by describing the variety of things which God created out of extension alone (i.e. out of physical substance alone). Given that we obtain ideas of external things by viewing them through God, this does not mean that we actually can see the inner nature of God himself. God's nature is simple, and the ideas of things we see in God are complex.
A second argument for Malebranche's own theory is that it highlights God's sovereignty more than the alternative theory. His third argument is based on how we acquire abstract or general ideas, such as the universal notion of a triangle. General ideas are initially formed in God, and we access these through God. He argues that we cannot conceive of universal abstract ideas unless we saw all beings included in one, which we as humans cannot do on our own accord. Unlike humans, God can direct the mind in a wide range of different manners
We, then, access these ideas through God. Using the abstract idea of "the infinite" as a starting point, Malebranche gives a variation of Descartes' proof of God's existence in Meditation 3. For Descartes, we have an innate idea of infinite perfection which must have been implanted in us by an infinitely perfect being (i.e., God). Malebranche's argument is as follows:
Malebranche turns to his final proof that we see all things in God. Since God creates all things for his own purpose, then as human creatures we cannot perceive anything without seeing God in those things. This is obviously that case when considering that all our love (or desire) is directed toward God. However, we see God especially when we consider necessary truths, such as those of mathematics and ethics. Malebranche cites Augustine who argues that we see God in the ideas behind truths. For Malebranche, though, we see God in the truths themselves. In addition to eternal truths, we also know all facts about the physical world by viewing them in God. When we see all things in God, though, it is not as if we ourselves are sensing them in God. Instead, God actively places these ideas in us by making the appropriate physiological modifications in our souls. God, thus, is the source of all ideas including facts about the physical world, necessary truths (such as 2+2=4), and moral truths (such as that we must love good). The manner in which God gives us these ideas, though, differs. Ideas of necessary truths, for example, come from a union or direct acquaintance with God himself.
Malebranche concludes that this is the most probable of all the theories of how we acquire ideas of objects. He also notes how it makes God actively involved in all causal relations which we are part of. He continues in Chapter Seven outlining the various ways we know things. We know God through himself. We know bodies through the ideas which God gives us of them. We know our own souls through consciousness and inner sensation. Finally, we know other people's minds only through conjecture, based on their resemblance to ourselves.
Occasionalism
Occasionalism is the view that God is the principal force behind all causal events. For example, when a baseball bat strikes a baseball, God is the actual cause of the motion of the baseball. The bat is merely the occasional or incidental cause which signals God to actually move the ball. Hints of this position are first found in Descartes' Principles on Philosophy 2:36. In defending the view that "God is the Primary Cause of Motion." Descartes argues as follows:
Malebranche begins explaining how ancient philosophers postulated metaphysical entities as the basis of causal force. He refutes this position by pushing it to the point of absurdity. His first observation about their contention is that if something has causal power, it is to some degree divine. He continues his reduction to absurdity noting that anything with such power is superior to us and entitled to be worshipped. Following the logic of the ancient philosophers, then, it make some kind of sense to worship the sun as the sovereign divinity in view of the sun's causal power over nature. Having rejected the ancient conception of the source of causation, Malebranche argues that God is the true cause of all motion. His argument is as follows:
Malebranche offers additional arguments showing why God must be the true cause of bodily motion, even if our wills are involved too. First, if God would make someone move contrary to his desire, the person's desire would clearly be only the occasional cause, and not the true cause. Second, if God make a person's will the true cause of an event, then, in acts of creation and destruction, the person's will would be the true cause of this as well. This is especially absurd when considering non-human decisions in which the wills of animals and even the natural dispositions of matter may be present along with God's will. These, clearly, are not the true causes of the resulting motion, creation, or destruction. Third, if God could give such power to people, animals or matter, he would be making them into gods, which God cannot do. For Malebranche, superstitions and Godless beliefs resulted from the failure to recognize God as the true cause of all. Just as proper religion teaches us that there is only one true God, proper philosophy teaches us that there is only one true cause of everything.
It is from the idea of infinite being, with which we are directly acquainted, that we form our ideas of finite beings. Specifically, we reduce our notion of infinite being to make it finite.
[The cause of motion in nature] is in fact twofold: first, there is the universal and primary cause -- the general cause of all the motions in the world. And second, there is the particular cause which produces in an individual piece of matter some motion which it previously lacked. Now as far as the general cause is concerned, it seems clear to me that this is no other than God himself. In the beginning in his omnipotence he created matter, along with its motion and rest. And now, merely by his regular concurrence, he preserves the same amount of motion and rest in the material universe as he put there in the beginning. ... Thus, God imparted various motions to the parts of matter when he first created them, and he now preserves all this matter in the same way, and by the same process by which he originally created it. And it follows from what we have said that this fact alone makes it most reasonable to think that God likewise always preserves the same quantity of motion in matter.
Descartes' argument above is this:
What Descartes hinted at, his followers articulated more precisely. French historian and Cartesian philosopher Geraud de Cordemoy (d. 1684) drew a distinction between the "true cause" of an event, which is God, and its "occasional cause," such as the bat striking the ball. Malebranche further developed Cordemoy's reasoning and produced the definitive defense of the theory of occasionalism. His defense appears in the following selections from The Search after Truth, Book 6, part 2, chapter 3, titled, "Of the Most Dangerous Error in Philosophy; Of the Ancients."
Malebranche offers two arguments in defense of premise (d) above. First, we cannot be the cause of moving our arms (for example) since we do not understand how this is done. Second, it is incomprehensible that we should be the true cause of moving our arms since we see no necessary connection between our will and our movement. However, there is a necessary connection between God as cause, and such movement. For Malebranche, God's power is his will. God, then, is the true cause of all motion. The natural causes we see around us are what he calls occasional or incidental causes. Just as God is the true cause of all physical motion, Malebranche continues explaining that God is also the true cause of all mental events which are nonphysical. He argues specifically that God is the true cause of human sensation and bodily motion. Suppose, for example, I wish to move my arm. My task is to will this event. This becomes the cue for God to physically move my arm through physiological causes. For reasons of efficiency, God would not give us (or an angel) that kind of power to be the true cause since this would involve two wills: God's and the angels.
